The exclusion of vulnerable countries is, in my view, one of the central failures of the COP process today. Some COPs were perceived as privileging Western nations while others  worked mostly with BRICS and Arab groups. In each case, many parties felt left out, which is not a good sign. 

But what troubles me most is the impact on small island states and least developed countries. The real value of the COP is that these vulnerable nations have a voice — and historically, a strong one. That is no longer the case. It has become take-it-or-leave-it for them, year after year. 

And now they have mostly stopped fighting for ambition on mitigation and are only focused only on finance and adaptation. Small island nations were once the loudest voices for climate ambition in this process. That silence is deeply telling. There was certainly heavy US pressure on Caribbean nations, but regardless, when the most vulnerable no longer advocate for themselves, something has gone wrong with this process. 

The success of Paris is really a synthesis of all this. It involved extensive use of France’s diplomatic presence in countries, with consultation at the national level. There was a capacity — or at least a need — to know what was happening in each country, and we were, in a way, helping this to happen, even where there was not much public discussion. We had at least three ministerial meetings before the COP, so people already knew they were in charge of specific issues. They had a political view because they knew each other. At least the 35 representing the different groups had already had the conversation, so there was direct interaction. 

I think this is absolutely crucial, because we will never get more ambition if we keep everybody in the dark and then finally present a compromise, which is never balanced. People come with red lines, but through interaction — and understanding the red lines of others — you give time, and you can reach a better result than in the last three COPs. 

The final element — perhaps the most underappreciated — was the connection between presidencies, and the value of joint preparation. That helped us enormously. We integrated the Peruvian team into the French team. The invitation for the ministerial was signed by Laurent Fabius and Manuel Pulgar Vidal, and they chaired together. The Peruvian diplomats remained part of the French team until the very end, when we finalised the text. 

This was extremely useful, because they brought different views and had their own contacts with the G77. It was necessary, because every country has a perceived bias — real or not — and France, as an old colonial power, is still seen as a developed, post-colonial country. Working with Peru sent different signals and helped us understand cultural perspectives and underlying prejudices. That was very valuable. 

Now Brazil needs to help the Turkish and Australian presidencies work together, as they will each bring their own perspectives. That is really important. 

The success of Paris is really a synthesis of all this. It involved extensive use of France’s diplomatic presence in countries, with consultation at the national level. There was a capacity — or at least a need — to know what was happening in each country, and we were, in a way, helping this to happen, even where there was not much public discussion. We had at least three ministerial meetings before the COP, so people already knew they were in charge of specific issues. They had a political view because they knew each other. At least the 35 representing the different groups had already had the conversation, so there was direct interaction. 

I think this is absolutely crucial, because we will never get more ambition if we keep everybody in the dark and then finally present a compromise, which is never balanced. People come with red lines, but through interaction — and understanding the red lines of others — you give time, and you can reach a better result than in the last three COPs. 

The final element — perhaps the most underappreciated — was the connection between presidencies, and the value of joint preparation. That helped us enormously. We integrated the Peruvian team into the French team. The invitation for the ministerial was signed by Laurent Fabius and Manuel Pulgar Vidal, and they chaired together. The Peruvian diplomats remained part of the French team until the very end, when we finalised the text. 

This was extremely useful, because they brought different views and had their own contacts with the G77. It was necessary, because every country has a perceived bias — real or not — and France, as an old colonial power, is still seen as a developed, post-colonial country. Working with Peru sent different signals and helped us understand cultural perspectives and underlying prejudices. That was very valuable. 

Now Brazil needs to help the Turkish and Australian presidencies work together, as they will each bring their own perspectives. That is really important. 

I think we need to make a much stronger case for continuity between presidencies, because in reality that’s the only thing we can really rely on. The presidency is not just about chairing the COP itself — it should involve working with the previous and next presidencies and preparing together. Formally, presidencies have a full year after the COP, but what they actually do with that time varies a lot, some immediately stop after the conference.  

Second, the first week of the COP deserves a hard look. We are losing significant time there, as the negotiating items have become much more political rather than technical. This calls for a reflection on how that first week is structured, and how it links to preparation before the COP. In particular, pre-COP and ministerial meetings should be used more effectively to engage on the real political issues in advance 

Third, the proliferation of inter-sessional ministerial meetings is becoming a distraction. Ahead of COP30 there was the Petersburg Dialogue, a Danish initiative, and MoCA, which are all well-intentioned, but they operate in silos. Each has a different presidency; there is no cumulative progression, and they rarely move the needle on substantive issues. If these meetings are to have value, they need to be sequenced deliberately and coherently build towards the COP. 

Brazil made a genuine effort — trying to limit the proliferation of initiatives, regroup them, and create some accountability for delivery. That was the right instinct. But they couldn't prevent new initiatives from coming in, and the accountability mechanism was never fully formalised. That needs to change. 

I hope that at the June SB meeting, someone raises this directly: how do we make these initiatives formally report to the COP? Not just a side event in the first week, but an actual mandate to report — in the official setting, with negotiators present. Not because it dramatically changes the negotiations, but because it creates a real link between the action agenda and the formal process. That link is increasingly missing. 

Take the transition away from fossil fuels. It may never become a negotiated agenda item — the opposition from some parties is simply too strong. But 80 countries have committed to it. They can organise. The question is how their progress feeds back into the official process. That, I think, is the innovation we need to pursue.

This was a deliberate effort, based on experience, to overcome the prejudice that France, as a developed country, would only consult with Europeans or larger nations like the US. Initially, there was significant distrust.  

Our methodology required that every ambassador submit weekly reports on their country's positions — a massive undertaking, but essential. France's extensive diplomatic network was a real advantage, and we leveraged it alongside Peruvian embassies where possible. Regional forums were central to this, allowing regions to drive their own discussions while smaller nations with limited bilateral capacity could observe and engage. 

We also organised ministerial pre-meetings ensuring LDC groups, African nations, and small island states had seats at the table. The goal was to counteract the natural over-representation of wealthier nations and ensure every group felt genuinely included. 

After extensive consultations with developing countries — and especially with small island developing states, which were very active — the negotiating text coming out of the technical track still had around 9,000 brackets. At the end of the first week, we were in a kind of panic mode. 

What we did then was go back to each group — and at that moment we had not really separated the technical and ministerial tracks, they were working together — and ask them, on all these 9,000 brackets in their topic, to identify what was truly important and central, and what could in fact be set aside. They did the job. That allowed us to come back with a much cleaner text, with far fewer brackets. 

From there, the remaining issues — the more political ones — were taken up at ministerial level, with constant interaction between ministers and the technical groups. 

Even if you cannot have everyone in the room, we tried to ensure a strong sense of transparency. Information was circulating as much as possible, and there were screens outside the rooms so that delegations, NGOs and others could follow the discussions. That helps a lot — you don’t have closed doors. 

I believe enormously in that. You cannot negotiate with 100 people in the room, but you can have a small group negotiating while others are present and listening. That is essential, because transparency is a recipe for success, where closed door is a recipe for failure and frustration, and we can't advance like this. And this is something we have forgotten totally since Paris, mostly. And I don't get why. Is it COVID? Is it the difficult geopolitics? I don't know, but I think it's a plague. This lack of transparency is a plague and it should be stopped. 

The major challenge is that COP 30, following the first Global Stock Take (GST) in Dubai, failed to fully resolve the conflict and draw necessary consequences for new climate plans. There was a view by some parties in Brazil that the Stock Take was merely an assessment, not a mandate for action. The second GST must avoid this; it must be imperatively viewed as a recommendation for implementation, not just an assessment to be ignored.  

A positive step from the Brazilian presidency was linking the Action Agenda to implementing GST conclusions, which should be communicated before 2028. The GST must be taken seriously, and the second one, unlike the first, cannot be a collective assessment without implications, as it will be closer to 2050. At that point, the next contributions must align absolutely with the 2050 commitments, integrating long-term strategies into the five-year plan. This preparation for the second GST is crucial. 

We really need to see a shift in how subnational actors are incorporated. The preparations in Rio were quite successful, yet they were never formally linked to or reported at the COP, which is a real missed opportunity. I've always maintained that the COP system must evolve to give local authorities, those actually making decisions and staying connected to their citizens, a seat at the table in some form. 

India's powerful federal system grants states significant policy importance, particularly in climate agendas, even those within Prime Minister Modi's coalition. India should ensure strong state representation and elevate its capacity for global subnational mobilisation, a strength previously demonstrated in Brazil. 

The second: we will be in a phase where industrial transformation is very advanced, and that's the case in India, too. So maybe prepare an agenda where industrial policy and industry transformations themselves are a very big part of the COP agenda. 

And then, if it hosts, India should work on creating links and begin outreach with small developing countries early to incorporate their interests, values, and views into the preparations. I do think that, again, the Brazilians made a lot of space for BRICS countries, but not so much for the smaller developing countries. In my view, this is something that India should focus on.